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NIGHT SESSION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, 22–23 OCTOBER 1962
Alexander Fursenko
Translated by Yuri M. Zhukov

O

n the night of 22 October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev* arranged for all mem†
bers of the Presidium to be telephoned and summoned to a meeting. At
about seven o’clock at night, Moscow time, all were asked to promptly report to
the Kremlin. When the Central Committee’s secretary, Frol R. Kozlov, then
Khrushchev’s right-hand man, was asked by deputy premier Anastas I. Mikoyan
the reason for the emergency session, the former replied that “an important an1
nouncement is expected from [President John F.] Kennedy regarding Cuba.”
According to official records, the session in the Kremlin commenced at ten
2
o’clock at night, while it was still midday across the Atlantic. The agenda before
the Presidium was entitled, “On the determination of a position on further steps
3
regarding Cuba and Berlin.” Although no one yet had a clear understanding of
what Kennedy was planning on announcing, Khrushchev had received information indicating that the president’s address would be devoted to Cuba.
At a morning meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in
Washington, the resident chief of Soviet military intelligence (the GRU) reported that a large redeployment of American forces was taking place in the
southern United States. In its corresponding cable to Moscow, the GRU also reported that “since morning in Washington there has been heightened activity
among the most senior government and military authorities,” a meeting had

* 1894–1971; premier of the Soviet Union—formally general secretary of the Communist Party
(1953–64) and chairman of the Council of Ministers (1958–64).
† The Politburo (Political Bureau, the standing executive group) of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union was known as the Presidium from 1952 to 1966.
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been scheduled between the president and congressional leaders, and at noon it
was announced that a televised address by Kennedy would air at seven o’clock in
4
the evening concerning an important matter of U.S. national security.
Three days prior, a leading American observer, Joseph Alsop, had argued in a
New York Herald Tribune opinion column entitled “What Is More Important?”
that the central focus of a future Soviet-American conflict would be Berlin, lambasting those “pre-election campaign orators”* who “shriek of Cuba”:
To consider Cuba to be more important than Berlin at such a moment, when in
Berlin, in all likelihood, a crisis is headily ripening . . . is the same as making every effort to cure a patient’s bursitis while paying no attention to his cancerous tumor.
Cuba is sooner like bursitis—a disease that irritates the afflicted and brings him
much discomfort. As is done with bursitis, it will likely need to be treated, perhaps
even necessitating some radical measures. However, to complicate the critically dangerous Berlin problem by madly insisting on the immediate resolution of the situation in Cuba is not only irresponsible, but simply criminal. 5

This article was sent to Moscow via a cable the same day, arriving on the desks of
Kremlin leaders.
Despite his close ties to the White House, Alsop did not know at the time that
a U-2 spy plane had just discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba or that top-secret
meetings were being held day and night by the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom), a body created by President Kennedy for the
purpose of developing a response to this Soviet challenge.
Soviet intelligence found itself in the dark as well. Even though the resident KGB
official in Washington, A. S. Feklisov, had assured his superiors that he had four reliable informants in the highest echelons of the U.S. government, he received no word
from them about this development and consequently was almost completely unable
to keep Moscow informed. Neither he nor Dobrynin knew that there were Soviet
missiles in Cuba in the first place. This secrecy was an important precondition of
†
Operation ANADYR ; by narrowing as much as possible the circle of those who knew
about its existence, its planners could more easily prevent inadvertent leaks of information. As a result, when he was invited to the State Department to receive the text
of Kennedy’s speech at six o’clock in the evening, Dobrynin did not yet know what
topic the president would address, Berlin or Cuba. As suggested by their cables,
GRU officials did not know either. “The press emphasizes,” they reported, “that the
reasons for this vigorous government activity are being held in the strictest secrecy.
6
Plans are being discussed about possible new steps with regard to Cuba or Berlin.”
* Midterm elections were to be held that November.
† The Soviet code name for the 1962 plan to deploy ballistic missiles, medium-range bombers, and a
regiment of mechanized infantry in Cuba.
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THE SESSION OPENS: WHAT WILL KENNEDY SAY ON CUBA?
Khrushchev, who knew of neither the photographs taken by the U-2 nor the secret ExCom sessions, understood that a potential leak of information would
turn Cuba into an object of acute confrontation, irrespective of Moscow’s extensive precautions. “It has become known,” he stated in his opening remarks to the
session, “that [Kennedy] is preparing some kind of address.” The General Secretary cited a report from the Soviet news agency TASS that “in the area of the Ca7
ribbean Sea, U.S. naval vessels carrying infantry are massing.” He named no
other sources and promptly yielded the floor to the minister of defense, Marshal
Rodion Y. Malinovsky, who had been invited to the session to propose options
for managing the impending crisis.
Having now received information through military intelligence channels that
the topic of Kennedy’s speech would be Cuba and having assessed the correlation of forces in that theater, the defense minister concluded that a “blitzkrieg”
was impossible. “I don’t think [the Americans] would be able to launch something right away,” he said. “If an invasion of Cuba will be announced, then another day would have to pass [for the United States] to get ready.” Malinovsky
did not exclude the possibility that Kennedy’s radio address would be a
“pre-election trick”; in fact, the defense minister evidently wanted this to be the
case. In addition, Malinovsky stressed that Soviet missiles had not been deployed to Cuba for the mission of a military assault on the United States, noting,
“We have not striven to place the missiles on an hour’s alert.” The minister’s remarks were followed by those of the General Staff ’s chief of operations, General
Semyon Ivanov, who reported on the capabilities of military installations as envisioned under Operation ANADYR and on the movement of ships carrying mili8
tary cargoes to Cuba.
Having listened to the military briefings, Khrushchev agreed with his colleagues’ conclusions. He remarked that a cable just received from Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko regarding meetings [in the United States with Secretary of
State Dean Rusk] stated that “Kennedy was very cautiously formulating his
thoughts on Cuba,” while Rusk “had been drinking during the meeting and
leading discussions about Berlin, insistently hinting at Cuba.” Rusk had declared
9
to Gromyko, “Cuba is to us what Hungary is to you.” Rusk’s words were a nearly
verbatim repetition of a statement Kennedy had made to Alexei I. Adzhubei,
Khrushchev’s son-in-law and editor of Izvestia, during a meeting in the White
House in early 1962. Khrushchev remembered this well and concluded that the
coincidence could not have been unintentional.
Expounding his own position, Khrushchev asserted, “The heart of the matter
is that we don’t want to unleash a war. What we want is to cause a bit of a scare, to
10
deter [U.S.] forces with respect to Cuba.” “In their own time, the U.S. did the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/9
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same thing, placing a belt of missile bases around our country. That deterred us,”
11
he admitted. Khrushchev observed that the difficulty of the situation was that
“we have not deployed everything that we wanted [and] didn’t make public the
agreement [on mutual assistance with Cuba].” Soviet ships had managed to deliver SS-4 (R-12) missiles, with a two-thousand-kilometer range, but the longerrange SS-5 (R-14) missiles were still en route. In sum, Khrushchev described the
state of affairs as “tragic.” He predicted, “They could attack, we would respond.
12
This could spill out into a big war.”
What solution could there be? Khrushchev suggested publicly announcing
the USSR’s mutual assistance treaty with Cuba. He asked himself, “How would
the U.S. react to this?” In a first scenario, he anticipated that “they could announce a blockade of Cuba.” Second, “[they could] commandeer our ships passing to Cuba.” Third, Washington could announce that the United States “was not
13
even thinking about attacking Cuba.” Khrushchev now proposed to authorize,
in the event of a U.S. invasion, a resort to emergency measures, up to and includ14
ing the use of tactical nuclear weapons. “All forces are not to use tactical nuclear
weapons in the opening phase,” he ordered. “If there is a troop landing—[use]
15
tactical nuclear weapons. As for strategic [weapons]—wait for orders.” He
then suggested sending the relevant instructions to the commander of Soviet
forces on the island, General Issa A. Pliev. Having shared these thoughts with the
Presidium’s members, Khrushchev announced a five- or ten-minute break “so
16
the comrades could think and express their opinions.”
PREPARING FOR THE WORST
By the time the meeting was readjourned, the deputy foreign minister, Vasily V.
Kuznetsov, had reported that the U.S. embassy in Moscow was requesting a
meeting with a Foreign Ministry representative an hour before Kennedy’s address. Additionally, Defense Minister Malinovsky and the chief of the General
Staff, Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov, announced that according to their sources—
which evidently meant the GRU—ambassadors from NATO and South American countries were being recalled for consultations.
The discussion that followed took place in an increasingly tense environment. The official minutes provide only a glimpse of the session’s actual proceedings. Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov* expressed deep concern about the
situation that had developed. Khrushchev suggested that the Presidium discuss
the text of the directive to be given to General Pliev. Malinovsky read aloud a
draft directive, after which the nuclear question became the center of attention.
Mikoyan spoke out pointedly against Malinovsky’s proposed directive, arguing
that it was fraught with the risk of war. In response, the defense minister was
* 1902–82, leading party theoretician, a member of the Presidium since 1955.
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forced to admit that “if nuclear weapons are to be used, then there are not that
many of them on Cuba.” He added that the Cubans themselves could be blamed
for a first strike.
Khrushchev protested, “If we do not use nuclear weapons, they could capture
Cuba.” Malinovsky replied, “The forces that the U.S. has in the Caribbean won’t
capture Cuba.” Khrushchev retorted, “The Americans could fire salvos from
their missile carriers, without sending aircraft.” Alexei N. Kosygin* then entered
the fracas (but the record of his comments is indecipherable). After Kosygin
spoke, Khrushchev declared, “I forbid the use of nuclear weapons against Cuba,”
17
implying that the Americans would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.
While he objected to the view presented by defense officials, Mikoyan did not
want—and was effectively unable—to challenge Khrushchev. The established
tradition of deference to the general secretary prevailed, although the deputy
premier disagreed with him. Mikoyan was categorically opposed to the use of
any form of nuclear weapons. Khrushchev, meanwhile, believed that any other
course of action was impossible. He then proposed that the crisis would be diffused if an announcement were made that “all the [missile] facilities are Cuban,
and the Cubans declare that they will respond [to U.S. attack].” Mikoyan emphatically objected to this proposal, saying that if Washington recognizes that
“the missiles are under our operational control, the Americans will understand
that we won’t be able to go on this adventure, since we know its consequences. . . .
And if they find out that the missiles belong to the masters of the island, they will
interpret this as a provocation, not ruling out that the Cubans could launch the
missiles preemptively.” Khrushchev agreed with this argument: “We’ll leave the
18
missiles as Soviet property, subordinate only to us.”
The instructions drafted for Pliev, proposed by Malinovsky and endorsed by
Khrushchev, stated that in the event of U.S. attack on the island, it was essential
to counter—jointly with the Cubans—the aggressor “with all means.” Mikoyan,
noting that “with all means” implied an authorization to use nuclear weapons,
raised the question of how one was to interpret the instructions: “So that means
[one could respond] with missiles as well . . . [causing the] beginning of a thermonuclear war?” Malinovsky, as Mikoyan recalled, “was not able to give an answer,
since this ambiguity was an obvious oversight on his part.” In Mikoyan’s words,
the defense minister “irresponsibly and unconditionally supported everything,”
never deviating from Khrushchev’s positions regarding any form of military response to the Americans.19
Indeed, if one recalls the insistence with which the defense minister had been
seeking a decision in May regarding the deployment of missiles to Cuba, it
* 1904–80; at that time first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Khrushchev’s successor as
premier from 1964 until just before his death.
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becomes apparent that the head of the military department was particularly
hawkish and risk-acceptant in his reasoning, which became a source of conflict
with proponents of a softer line—above all Mikoyan, whom Khrushchev regarded as a “Cuba specialist.”
The official record of Central Committee Presidium sessions over Khrushchev’s entire period in office shows that he and Mikoyan had frequent differences of opinion. Khrushchev could not stand objections but occasionally felt
compelled to agree with his colleague. On this occasion it became necessary to
soften the wording of the instructions. He asked Malinovsky to read “how the final
20
directives to Pliev will sound.” The text of the instructions was modified with a
caveat that all means were to be used “with the exception of the assets of
Statsenko [commander of the missile divisions] and Beloborodov [i.e., nuclear
warheads].”
In an uncharacteristic display of caution, having read out the text and assessed the situation, Malinovsky proposed that the final instructions not be
written in haste, preferring to wait and see what President Kennedy would say. In
essence, the marshal was following the lead of Khrushchev, who had just hypothesized that the United States might either announce a blockade or not take
any action at all, meaning that neither a bombardment nor an invasion of Cuba
would follow. Malinovsky proposed to wait one hour, until Kennedy’s announcement, and only then proceed with drafting detailed instructions. “Or
otherwise,” he said, “[the Americans] would be given a pretext to use nuclear
weapons.” All came to agreement on this rationale.
By the end of the night’s discussions, Khrushchev too had softened his tone.
He did not want to yield to pressure from Kennedy, who wanted, in his words,
“to demonstrate his firmness.” “It could not be ruled out,” he reiterated, “that
this is a bluff ahead of the congressional elections.” However, practical considerations ultimately trumped emotions. Khrushchev was concerned about the
heavy-lift ship Aleksandrovsk, which had been sent to Cuba with a cargo of nuclear warheads, and suggested that caution be exercised. “If we give Pliev the instructions [already approved and now being relayed to the General Staff by
General Ivanov], we shouldn’t make an announcement about the agreement [on
mutual assistance with Cuba] now, since they may not hold back.” The
Aleksandrovsk, then in the approaches to Cuba, was given orders “to proceed to
the nearest port.” As a result, the vessel was able to evade U.S. pursuit and cross
the quarantine line before the blockade was launched, entering the Cuban port
of Mariel instead of the original destination of Havana.
At 1:15 in the morning, Kuznetsov delivered the text of Kennedy’s address,
which had just been received by the Foreign Ministry. Having read it, Khrushchev
concluded, “It seems to me that according to the tone this is not a [declaration
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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of] war against Cuba, but some kind of ultimatum.” On this point it was decided
21
to close the session and readjourn later in the morning.
Khrushchev spent the rest of the night in the Kremlin. He slept, fully clothed, on
the sofa in his office. The session resumed at ten in the morning, after Kennedy’s
address had been thoroughly analyzed. If the Kremlin had been dominated by an
atmosphere of anxious suspense and alarm prior to the U.S. president’s announcement, this morning the situation was radically changed. The previous
buoyancy had returned. The Presidium approved the substance of the Soviet
government’s official response to Kennedy’s announcement of a Cuban blockade; the Foreign Ministry drafted the resulting statement’s text, sent it to the
press, and broadcast it on the radio.22
THE SUBMARINE QUESTION
During the day that followed, in a discussion of further actions regarding four
Soviet [Foxtrot-class, diesel-powered] submarines sent to the region several
weeks before, Defense Minister Malinovsky’s proposals met fresh objections
from Mikoyan. Malinovsky was not a member of the Presidium and was present
only by invitation. Mikoyan spoke out decisively against the plan to send Soviet
submarines to Havana,* preferring to keep them outside Cuban territorial waters,
at a distance of a three-day passage. In his opinion, the boats could be discovered
rather easily while they were approaching the Cuban coast, inevitably resulting
in a confrontation with the U.S. Navy, which would “worsen the situation even
more and give rise to a serious conflict.” Nevertheless, Malinovsky, having garnered the support of several members of the Presidium, insisted on sending the
23
submarines to Cuba.
During lunch, Mikoyan sat next to Khrushchev and tried to convince him to
change his mind. “I thought about it a great deal,” he said, “and believe that it is
necessary to return once again to the discussion of the submarine question, because I think [my] suggestion was wrongly rejected.” Khrushchev agreed, and
the issue went back on the table. Malinovsky continued to insist aggressively that
the submarines could “approach the shores of Cuba undetected.” Mikoyan attempted to convince the members of the Presidium that the defense minister’s
suggestion was impossible and dangerous. However, his concerns were brushed
off once again. The “Cuba specialist” decided to make one final attempt. He proposed to summon to the evening session the commander in chief of the Soviet
Navy, Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, with the apparent intention of exploiting the
well known friction between the defense minister and the naval commander.
* See Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov, “A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973
Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 2 (Spring 2004), esp. pp.
28–29.
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Gorshkov, as Mikoyan later remembered, “very clearly showed on the map”
that the proposed approaches to Cuba were exceedingly problematic for submarines, since the littoral region was shallow, sinuous, and full of small islands.
In order to approach the island, the submarines would need to pass through a
narrow strait, which was under radar surveillance by a U.S. naval base located on
a nearby island.* In other words, to cross this choke point covertly was impossible. Gorshkov suggested that the submarines be held two or three days from the
island, which was precisely what Mikoyan wanted. Mikoyan, revolted by
Malinovsky’s incompetence on the issue, later recalled that the defense minister
“was unable to raise any objections” to the admiral’s assessment. Gorshkov,
meanwhile, “proved to be of very great service [in preventing] the false move the
defense minister wanted to make,” enabling the deputy premier ultimately to
outmaneuver the defense minister. In this quarrel with a Presidium member—
24
and a skillful politician—Malinovsky was forced to concede.
At last, Khrushchev authorized sending the four diesel submarines destined
for Cuba to a point two days from the island. The full significance of this decision became known only in subsequent decades, when it was revealed that each
had been armed with one nuclear-tipped torpedo. Due to numerous technical
problems and deficiencies, the diesel boats were forced regularly to the surface,
†
where they were easily—and repeatedly—spotted by U.S. antisubmarine forces.
Recent eyewitness accounts indicate that only with great difficulty did the
submariners avoid becoming engaged in armed confrontation. On returning to
the motherland the participants of the submarine mission were awaited by neither honor nor reward. To the contrary, the commander in chief of the Warsaw
Pact forces, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, pounced on them with the accusation
that the boats, by rising to the surface, had allowed themselves to be discovered
by the enemy; he declared that the submariners deserved court-martial. Admiral
Gorshkov came to their defense, extinguishing the fury of the army leadership.
Nevertheless, the identity of the submariners, who had exhibited uncommon
endurance and bravery under the difficult circumstances of the Cuban missile
crisis and successfully returned the boats to their docks, remained secret for
* Referring generally to the transit of the Bahamas chain. In view of the short detection range of surface radar against a periscope or snorkel, the location of the U.S. bases, and the variety of routes
available to the submarines, it is not clear to what Gorshkov might have been referring or why he
gave such prominence to U.S. shore-based radar (as opposed to surface and air antisubmarine
forces) as a threat. The editors are grateful for the views on this point of Capt. Joseph Bouchard,
USN (Ret.).
† See John R. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,”
Naval War College Review 58, no. 2 (Spring 2005), esp. p. 98. See also Goldstein and Zhukov, and
Owen R. Cote, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper 16 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), chap. 4.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:36 AM

9

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 9

FURSENKO

137

many years. This issue entered the public domain only on the fortieth anniver25
sary of the crisis; subsequently it received much attention in the press.
WAS A NUCLEAR GREEN LIGHT EVER GIVEN?
The story of the night session of the Presidium of the Central Committee and
the questions discussed therein would not be complete without mention of
Khrushchev’s attitude on the use of nuclear weapons. In the course of the meeting he made his position unmistakably clear. Although Khrushchev repeatedly—
both at the time of the crisis and afterward—emphasized that an attack on the
United States was never the purpose of deploying missiles to Cuba, under the
circumstances of the crisis he did not exclude their use as a means of defense. It is
not difficult to imagine what would have been the outcome of such a course of
action.
This question became a subject of debate and speculation after Khrushchev’s
death. At the 1992 Havana conference of participants of the Cuban crisis and
scholars who had studied its history, General Anatoly N. Gribkov announced
that the commander of Soviet ground forces in Cuba, General Pliev, was given
the authority—in the event of an emergency situation brought about by U.S.
land invasion and interruption of communication with Moscow—to use tactical nuclear weapons. This announcement became a sensation and was covered
in world newspapers. However, Gribkov’s revelation also provoked numerous
questions at the conference, as well as much doubt. In support of his version of
the story, Gribkov subsequently published a General Staff document containing
the relevant instructions in his book on Operation ANADYR, coauthored with a
U.S. general, William Y. Smith. At the bottom of the document were the signa26
tures of Malinovsky and the chief of the General Staff, Matvei Zakharov.
The Defense Ministry archives indeed have such an instruction on file, which
had to be cosigned by the said individuals to have become official. However, the
document was signed by Zakharov alone. Malinovsky did not place his signature
on it, since the document had been sanctioned neither by the Presidium of the
Central Committee nor personally by Khrushchev. In publishing this document,
Gribkov failed to specify that the minister’s signature was not on it, admitting to
this omission in a Russian publication only a few years later. The general, however, insisted that Pliev had in any case received such authorization in the form
of an oral order relayed through Gribkov personally, who arrived in Cuba three
days before the beginning of the crisis.
Although the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a U.S. invasion of
the island was a possibility, it is highly doubtful that the Party’s leadership would
have delegated to the military the authority to make that decision. The Soviet
system prohibited in principle such an option. Meanwhile, it was absolutely
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/9
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impossible that Malinovsky, who Gribkov said tasked the latter with orally communicating the orders to Pliev, could have done so without Khrushchev’s official
approval. For his part, Khrushchev, who at all times covered himself by diffusing
accountability through “collective” resolutions, was unlikely to have resorted to
such imprudent means. It is thus difficult to imagine that such orders affecting
the fate of the world could have been relayed orally or, more importantly, come
into force as the result of communication through any one person, however high
a position he held. Not only under the Soviet system but in the framework of any
system such a practice was unthinkable, whatever eyewitnesses may later claim.
Neither archival documents nor the testimonies of the direct participants confirm that such a decision was ever made.
From the moment of Gribkov’s arrival in Cuba in 1962 as part of the General
Staff ’s delegation, he was continuously escorted by Pliev’s deputy for combat
training, Major General Leonid S. Garbuz. The latter has categorically denied
that such an order existed or that its very possibility was even a subject of discussion. Garbuz, who had served in missile divisions since 1952, had other ways of
knowing what Khrushchev’s actual orders were. Prior to being dispatched to
Cuba in mid-July 1962, he—along with General Pavel B. Dankevich, another of
Pliev’s deputies, who was initially to have led the group of Soviet forces in
Cuba—was received by Marshal Malinovsky and then Khrushchev himself. “We
have decided to slip a hedgehog under America,” Khrushchev said, “to help
Cuba, so America doesn’t swallow her up.” But the burden of his remarks, according to Garbuz, was that nuclear weapons were being deployed to Cuba
exclusively as a means of “deterrence,” not to be launched under any circumstances. Later this formulation was confirmed by written orders from the Minis27
try of Defense.
The ambassador to Cuba at the time, Aleksandr I. Alekseev, has been just as
categorical on this question. He was the most trusted Kremlin representative on
the island and, as a member of the Military Council,* would certainly have
known of the existence of such an order. Alekseev recalled that Gribkov’s asser†
tion at the 1992 Havana meeting irritated Fidel Castro. The latter was present at
all the conference’s panel discussions but did not take the floor on this subject,
since he was, in Alekseev’s words, preoccupied with preventing denigration of
28
the conduct of the Cuban leadership during the crisis.
All that is known from archival documents and the memoirs of the participants demonstrates that Pliev was unconditionally forbidden to make any
* The Main Military Council comprised the senior leadership of the Defense Ministry, reporting in
wartime to the Defense Council, the supreme national-security decision-making organ.
† Castro had taken power in Cuba in 1959.
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discretionary decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons. On 27 October
1962, via special cable, Malinovsky confirmed the ban on the use of any such
29
weapon.
A SOLITARY VOICE OF RESTRAINT
Despite the fortunate fact that Soviet ground commanders in Cuba were not authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of U.S. aggression, the minutes
of the 22–23 October 1962 emergency Presidium session reveal a disturbing picture. A lack of actionable intelligence regarding deliberations within the Kennedy
White House left key decision makers in the Kremlin uninformed and compelled to act on the basis of unsubstantiated worst-case scenarios. This made for
a particularly volatile atmosphere, given the high profile of hawkish voices—
notably Khrushchev’s and Malinovsky’s—in the discussions. The debate over
the wording of orders to be given to theater commanders on the use of tactical
nuclear weapons is a clear demonstration of this precariousness. This volatility
was confirmed further by even more ill-conceived and sometimes outright bizarre suggestions, such as Khrushchev’s proposal to deceive the United States
into believing that the missiles were under the Cuban leadership’s command.
Another dangerous element that becomes apparent in the proceedings is an
utter lack of understanding of naval matters—in part by Khrushchev but especially by the ground forces, which dominated the Ministry of Defense leadership.
Only intervention by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the country’s leading maritime
strategist and the naval commander in chief, convinced the Presidium not to
send the already-imperiled Soviet submarines on what in all likelihood would
have become a suicide mission at best and the first salvo of a global nuclear war
at worst. While the results of this decision not to send the Foxtrots all the way
into Cuba were themselves less than rosy,* the alternative would almost certainly
have been perceived by the United States as a provocation, inviting unimaginable consequences.
In assessing this rare look at Soviet decision making during perhaps the most
dangerous gamble of the nuclear age, it is hard to overlook the critical role
played by Anastas Mikoyan. Through remarkable political maneuvering within
a decision-making apparatus that eschewed differences of opinion, Mikoyan
managed to calm the famously emotional Khrushchev and discredit the forceful,
if obsequious, Malinovsky. Had this powerful, if nearly solitary, voice of restraint been absent from the emergency Presidium session, one would be hard
pressed to conceive of a positive outcome to the Cuban missile crisis.
* In that by 20 November all four had been detected by U.S. antisubmarine forces—see Benedict, also
Goldstein and Zhukov.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/9

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:36 AM

12

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

140

Fursenko: Night Session of the Presidium of the Central Committee,22–23 Oct

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

NOTES

This paper was originally commissioned for
a conference on the “Cold War at Sea,” held
7–8 May 2004 at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. This article reflects
the personal views of the author and not
necessarily those of the government of the
Russian Federation. The editors express their
appreciation to Mr. Zhukov for his cooperativeness in preparing the translation.
1. Stenograph record of Anastas I. Mikoyan’s
memoirs, 19 January 1963. A. I. Mikoyan Archives, Russian State Archives of Socio-Political
History.
2. Proceedings of the sixtieth session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22–23
October 1962, recorded by A. K. Serov, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History.
3. Proceedings of the sixtieth session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22–23
October 1962, recorded by V. N. Malin,
Kremlin Archives, Presidium of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1954–1964 (Moscow: 2003),
p. 617.
4. Residency of the Main Intelligence Administration Center (GRU), 22 October 1962.
5. New York Herald Tribune, 19 October 1962.
6. Residency of the GRU, 22 October 1962.
7. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
8. Proceedings, recorded by Malin, p. 617.
9. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
10. Proceedings, recorded by Malin.
11. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. The decision to send tactical nuclear weapons
to Cuba was made by Khrushchev on 7

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:37 AM

September 1962, in reaction to an announcement by Kennedy threatening an invasion of
Cuba in the event that a Soviet missile base
was discovered there.
15. Proceedings, recorded by Malin.
16. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
17. Mikoyan memoirs.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
21. Ibid.
22. See Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro,
and Kennedy 1958–1964 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1997), pp. 247–48.
23. Proceedings, recorded by Malin. Kremlin Archives, Presidium of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1954–1964 (Moscow: 2003), p. 619. (In the
original recording only 22 October 1962 is
cited in the sixtieth proceedings. Serov’s proceedings are dated 22–23 October 1962,
which corresponds to the substance of the
events’ development.) Proceedings, recorded
by Serov.
24. Mikoyan memoirs.
25. For a recent eyewitness account, see Ryurik
A. Ketov, “The Cuban Crisis as Seen through
a Periscope,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28,
no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 217–31.
26. Anatoli I. Gribkov, General William Y. Smith,
and Alfred Friendly, Operation Anadyr: U.S.
and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1993), p. 183.
27. L. S. Garbuz, interview, October 1994.
28. A. I. Alekseev, interview, 15 November 1995.
29. Malinovsky, telegram to Pliev, 27 October
1962, Archives of the President of the Russian
Federation.

13

